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WILL REGULATIONS PREVENT LITIGATION? AN ANALYSIS OF 
THE U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENTS 2017 REVENUE 







The two following factual scenarios depict two types of property 
whose landowners have claimed a Conservation Easement Deduction for 
placing a conservation easement on them under Section 170(h) of the 
Internal Revenue Code (“Section 170(h)”). 
Charles and Susan Glass (“the couple”) owned ten acres of land 
featuring “a high undeveloped bluff on 460 feet of shoreline [off of Lake 
Michigan]”1 that included threatened vegetation and a spot commonly 
frequented by bald eagles.
2
 The couple donated the 460 feet of shoreline to 
a “qualified organization” under Section 170(h) and claimed a $100,000 
                                                 
*
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deduction for the conservation easement they contributed.
3
 The Internal 
Revenue Service (“the Service”) audited the couple because it claimed 
they did not meet Section 170(h)’s “exclusively for conservation 
purposes” requirement.4 However, the tax court held that the couple did 
meet the requirement and qualified for a Section 170(h) deduction because 
the couple had “gratuitously surrendered valuable property rights . . . 
which preserve this Nation’s natural resources . . . consistent with the 
statute’s [policy] objective.”5 
In contrast, consider Kiva Dunes Golf Course (“Kiva Dunes”), 
located 12 miles south of Gulf Shores, Alabama, on the Fort Morgan 
Peninsula.
6
 E.A. Drummond, the golf course’s developer, purchased 
nearly 500 acres of beachfront land for $1 million in 1992 to create the 
golf course.
7
 While developing Kiva Dunes, Drummond also 
contemporaneously constructed a gated, residential resort community 
surrounding Kiva Dunes, including swimming pools, tennis courts, and 




 Id. at 259. 
5
 Id. at 283-84. 
6













In 2002, Drummond put a “perpetual conservation easement” on 
Kiva Dunes and transferred ownership of Kiva Dunes and its easement to 
a non-profit organization.
10
 The easement generally prohibited the 
development of the land for any purpose other than for a statutorily-
recognized conservation purpose, which includes use as a golf course.
11
 
Drummond claimed a $30.5 million deduction for a charitable contribution 
for the easement under Section 170(h).
12
 The Service, in 2005, audited 
Drummond and argued that Kiva Dune’s easement was an improper 
Conservation Easement Deduction because the easement’s valuation was 
heavily inflated.
13
 During the Service’s audit of Drummond, the Service’s 
commissioner, Steven Miller, testified to the United States Senate Finance 
Committee that “more than 340 [Section 170(h)] easement donors were 




 Id. at n. 4. 
10
 Id. at 1. 
11
 Id. at n. 5. Additionally, the non-profit organization to which Drummond transferred 
Kiva Dunes concurrently agreed to lease Kiva Dunes to Drummond. Id. 
12
 Id. at 1. 
13
 Ryan Dezember, Famed Coastal Alabama golf Course Kiva Dunes wins $28.7 Million 
tax Credit, AL.COM (Jul. 19, 2009, 9:59 AM), 
http://blog.al.com/live/2009/07/famed_coastal_alabama_golf_cou.html. 
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either under audit or would be soon.”14 Despite the Service’s efforts, after 
three years of auditing and litigation, the Service conceded that Kiva 
Dunes qualified for the Section 170(h) deduction.
15
 The tax court 
eventually reduced Drummond’s deduction by only $2 million, and 
Drummond successfully avoided paying any tax penalties.
16
 
II. THE CURRENT CLIMATE: THE SERVICE’S CRACK DOWN ON 
TAXPAYER ABUSE OF THE CONSERCATION EASEMENT DEDUCTION 
IS A SYMPTOM OF A LACK OF TREASURY REGULATION 
 
Since Kiva Dunes, the Service has been cracking down on taxpayer 
abuse of the Section 170(h)’s Conservation Easement Deduction.17 As the 
contrast between Glass and Kiva Dunes illustrates, the Service is doing so 
for two reasons. 
Chiefly, the Service is curbing abuse on the lucrative tax savings 
the deduction creates. An individual who makes a “qualified conservation-
contribution”18 of real property may deduct up to 50% of his or her 
adjusted gross income in the year of disposition of the land; a corporation 




 Richard Rubin, IRS Tees Off on Golf Courses’ Green Tax Claims, THE WALL STREET 







 See generally I.R.C. § 170(h) (2015), Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14 (2009).  
4
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that makes a qualifying contribution generally may deduct up to 10 % of 
its taxable income.
19
 Even more enticing, when the donated land’s value is 
greater than the taxpayer’s income in the year of disposition, the 
remaining deduction amount can also be applied to offset taxable income 
for 15 years following the donation of the conservation easement.
20
 While 
this tax deduction has been used for commendable purposes,
21
 there is 
mounting concern the Conservation Easement Deduction is abused by a 
small number of wealthy individuals who are avoiding tax liability by 
overestimating the value of their deductions and claiming deductions on 
ineligible land; the most notorious of which claim Conservation Easement 
Deductions for golf courses.
22
 In 2012, the most recent year for which data 
is available, 1,114 taxpayers on average claimed $872,250 in Conservation 
Easement Deductions; that combined equals almost $1 billion in untaxed 
                                                 
19
 I.R.C. § 170(h) (2015), Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14 (2009); see also DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2017 




 See generally I.R.C. § 170(h) (2015). 
21
 Rubin, supra note 15; see also Glass v. C.I.R., 124 T.C. 258, 258 (2005), aff'd, 471 
F.3d 698 (6th Cir. 2006). 
22
 Nancy A. McLaughlin, Conservation Easements and the Valuation Conundrum, 19 
FLA. TAX REV. 225, 228 (2016).   
5
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 Some scholars estimate that the U.S. federal government has 
forgone over $100 million in tax revenue as a result.
24
 
The Service is presently litigating approximately two dozen cases 
across the United States contesting the validity of taxpayers’ Conservation 
Easement Deduction claims “where there does not appear to be a 
conservation purpose served [in claims involving golf courses],” as 
Former-Commissioner Miller testified to the Senate Finance 
Committee.
25
 Notably, President Donald Trump also claimed the 
Conservation Easement Deduction for several golf courses in 1995, 2005, 




The second reason the Service is currently litigating so many cases 
is that litigation has been the only way the Service has been able to 
constrict taxpayer abuse. What makes the Service’s current crackdown 
against taxpayers significant is that it epitomizes the Conservation 
                                                 
23
 Rubin, supra note 15. 
24
 JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE “PROTECTING 
AMERICANS FROM TAX HIKES” ACT OF 2015, JCX-143-15 (2015). 
25
 Id.; Dezember, supra note 13. 
26
 Richard Rubin, Donald Trump’s Tax Numbers Sharpen Focus on Treatment of Losses, 
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trumps-
tax-numbers-tighten-focus-on-treatment-of-losses-1475415294. 
6
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Easement Deductions’ heavily-litigated forty-year history.27 The 
Conservation Easement Deduction has been the source of a significant 
amount of litigation because the regulations defining Section 170(h)’s key 
statutory terms of art are overly broad and do not create a clear framework 
for evaluating the accuracy of Conservation Easement Deduction 
valuations. While some scholars say the Service’s best present hope for 
reducing abuse is winning cases against taxpayers abusing the 
Conservation Easement Deduction,
28
 which would create binding 
authority, litigation is only a short-term solution. 
In response to this growing problem, the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury (“the Treasury”) has outlined in its “General Explanations of the 
Administration’s Fiscal Year 2017 Revenue Proposals” several 
recommendations that would lead to new regulations curbing taxpayer 
abuse of the Conservation Easement Deduction.
29
 The proposals would 
add new requirements and penalties to Section 170(h) and suggest creating 
an alternative conservation easement tax credit that could eventually 
                                                 
27
 See generally Jessica Jay & Melissa K. Thompson, An Examination of Court Opinions 
on the Enforcement And Defense of Conservation Easements and Other Conservation 
and Preservation Tools: Themes and Approaches To Date, CONSERVATION TAX CENTER. 
28
 Rubin, supra note 15. 
29
 2017 Treasury Proposal, supra note 19, at 224-29. 
7
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replace the Section 170(h) deduction.
30
 The Treasury has proposed for 
several years promulgating new regulations to constrict Section 170(h)’s 
breadth and, in its most recent proposals, has made some general 
indications on how it would curb abuse.
31
  
This article examines the Treasury’s 2017 proposals refining 
Section 170(h). This article assesses the likely effects of the Treasury’s 
proposals by discussing their impact in four key ways: (1) the new 
requirements placed on “qualified organizations” who receive 
conservation easement contributions; (2) donors’ increased substantiation 
requirements; (3) the exclusion of golf courses from Section 170(h) 
eligibility; and (4) the pilot conservation easement tax credit program. For 
each of these, this article will: examine the category’s current Section 




 Id.; see also DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE 
ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2016 REVENUE PROPOSALS 188-94 (2016), 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-
FY2016.pdf (herein “2016 Treasury Proposal”); DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL 
EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2015 REVENUE PROPOSALS 193 
(2015), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-
Explanations-FY2015.pdf (herein “2015 Treasury Proposal”); DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2014 REVENUE 
PROPOSALS 161 (2014), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2014.pdf (herein “2014 Treasury Proposal”); 
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL 
YEAR 2013 REVENUE PROPOSALS 140 (2013), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2013.pdf (herein “2013 Treasury 
Proposal”). 
8
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170(h) regulatory treatment, if any, outline what the new proposals 
require, and then walk through the likely effects of these proposals. This 
article argues that the most efficient regulatory approach available to the 
Treasury is to ban golf courses from Section 170(h) eligibility and leave 
all other current regulatory requirements on “qualified organizations” and 
donors the same to continue to encourage conservation easement 
donations. 
III. SEVEN SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN SECTION 170(H)’S HISTORY 
The Conservation Easement Deduction is codified in Internal 
Revenue Code (“the Code”) Section 170(h)(1). It states that “a ‘qualified 
conservation contribution’ [is] – (A) of a qualified real property interest, 
(B) to a qualified organization, (C) [made] exclusively for conservation 
purposes.”32 The statute’s current form has changed significantly over 
time. While there is no comprehensive history on Section 170(h),
33
 there 
are seven events that are significant to its history. 
                                                 
32
 I.R.C. § 170(h)(1) (2015).  
33
 McLaughlin, supra note 22. However, McLaughlin is the pre-eminent scholar on the 
Conservation Easement Deduction and her forthcoming publication is an exhaustive 
history of the Conservation Easement deduction as well as a thorough analysis of 
contemporary cases. Id. “To date, there has been no comprehensive analysis of the case 
law involving alleged overvaluation of conservation and façade easements for § 170(h) 
deduction purposes. This article fills that void.” Id. at 230. 
9
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The Service first authorized a conservation easement contribution 
to be a charitable income tax deduction in 1964 in Revenue Ruling 64-
205
34
 when the Service held “[a] gratuitous conveyance to the United 
States of America of a restrictive easement in real property . . . to preserve 
the scenic view of certain public properties, is a charitable contribution 
within the meaning of Section 170(h) of the Internal Revenue Code.”35  
Second, in the 1980s, following the enactment of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1976, “land trusts and public agencies began to use conservation 
easements routinely for protecting conservation lands.”36 This is 
significant because modernly land trusts and conservation public agencies 
are the recipients of Conservation Easement Deductions.
37
 Third, the Tax 
Reform Act became a part of the Code in the Tax Treatment Act of 1980 
                                                 
34
 Internal Revenue Serv., Understanding IRS Guidance – A Brief Primer, IRS.GOV (July 
6, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/uac/understanding-irs-guidance-a-brief-primer. A revenue 
ruling is an official interpretation by the IRS of the Internal Revenue Code, related 
statutes, tax treaties and regulations. It is the conclusion of the IRS on how the law is 
applied to a specific set of facts. Revenue rulings are published in the Internal Revenue 
Bulletin for the information of and guidance to taxpayers, IRS personnel, and tax 
professionals. Id.  
35
 Rev. Rul. 64-205, 1964-2 C.B. 62.  
36
 ELIZABETH BYERS & KARIN MARCHETTI PONTE, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT 
HANDBOOK 7 (Laurie Risino & Jessica Jay, eds., 1st ed. 2015). 
37
 Nancy McLaughlin, Increasing the Tax Incentives for Conservation Easement 
Donations - A Responsible Approach, 31 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY 1, 1 (2004).  
10
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(“the 1980 Act”), which significantly altered the 1976 legislation.38 To 
take the Conservation Easement Deduction, the 1980 Act required that a 
taxpayer prove the conservation easement will last for no less than 30 
years and be made exclusively for conservation purposes to a qualifying 
organization.
39
 It also defined “conservation purposes” to mean: (1) the 
preservation of land areas for public outdoor recreation, education, or 
scenic enjoyment; (2) the preservation of historically important land areas 
or structures; or (3) the protection of natural environmental systems.
40
 The 
above conservation purposes are the same as those listed in Section 
170(h)’s current codification. It is notable that Daniel Halperin, the 
Treasury’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, fortuitously 
expressed concern as to “whether procedures exist[ed] to insure that [a 
conservation easement] will continue to be used for conservation purposes 
and for the benefit of the general public.”41 
                                                 
38
 Nancy A. McLaughlin, Internal Revenue Code Section 170(h): National Perpetuity 
Standards for Federally Subsidized Conservation Easements (pt. 1), 45 REAL PROP. TR. 
& EST. L. J. 473, 478 (2010). 
39
 Id. at 476. 
40
 Id.  
41
 Miscellaneous Tax Bills: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of 
the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong. 3-4 (1979) (statement of Hon. Daniel I. 
Halperin, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Department of the Treasury). 
11
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Fourth, Congress passed moderate reforms to Section 170(h) in 
2006 outlining new circumstances in which penalties for deduction abuse 
were warranted and increasing the amount of substantiation required for 
an appraisal to meet all “qualified appraisal’s” requirements.42 Overall, 
however, Section 170(h)’s reform helped taxpayers take advantage of the 
Conservation Easement Deduction rather than curtail abuse.
43
 
Fifth, Senators Max Baucus (Democrat-Montana) and Orrin Hatch 
(Republican-Virginia) sponsored and authored the Rural Heritage 
Conservation Extension Act of 2013 which would have amended the Code 
to do two things.
44
 First, it would have made Conservation Easement 
Deduction levels permanent. Second, it would have banned the use of 
Conservation Easement Deductions for a contribution for “contributions of 
an easement for use on, or intended use on, a golf course.”45 The language 
of the Senate bill tracks verbatim the language used by the Treasury in its 
Green Book proposal in fiscal year 2013.
46
 
                                                 
42
 McLaughlin, supra note 22 at 229, n. 10; see also Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780, 
§§ 1213, 1219 (2006). 
43
 McLaughlin, supra note 22 at 229, n. 10.  
44
 Rural Heritage Conservation Extension Act, S. 526, 113th Cong. (2013).  
45
 Id.  
46
 Compare to 2013 Treasury Proposal, supra note 31.  
12
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Sixth, Representative Jim Gerlach (Republican-Pennsylvania) a 
similar bill was proposed in the House of Representatives in 2014 without 
a ban on golf courses, but it also was not enacted.
47
 
Finally, in 2015 Congress passed legislation modifying 
Conservation Easement Deductions without a ban or limitation on golf 
courses under Section 170(h).
48
 Some scholars argue that since 2006, 
Congress has effectively ignored the Conservation Easement Deduction’s 
main sources of abuse as reflected in ongoing litigation between the 
Service and taxpayers, and Congress has done nothing except codify 
“enhanced incentives” to benefit taxpayers taking the Conservation 
Easement Deduction, even when their valid conservation purpose is not 
apparent.
49
 Analysis of the Treasury’s proposals, as follows in Sections 
III, IV, V, and VI of this article explain how the Treasury proposes 
rectifying these abuses. 
                                                 
47
 Conservation Easement Incentive Act, H.R. 2807, 113th Cong. (2014). 
48




 2016 Treasury Proposal, supra note 31, at 189. “Court cases over the last decade have 
highlighted donors who have taken large deductions for overvalued easements and for 
easements that allow donors to retain significant rights or that do not further important 
conservation purposes.” Id. 
13
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IV. NEW REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED ON “QUALIFIED 
ORGANIZATIONS” FRUSTRATE THE POLICY GOALS OF SECTION 
170(H) 
 
A. Current Regulatory Scheme 
The current regulations set forth that to become a “qualified 
organization” for Conservation Easement Deduction purposes, a recipient 
donee organization must: (1) be one of four qualifying organizations, (2) 
demonstrate commitment to protect the donated land’s expressed 
conservation purposes, and (3) “have the resources to enforce the 
restrictions.”50 Each requirement is outlined further below. 
First, the regulations require that a “qualified organization” is: a 
governmental unit under Section 170(b)(1)(A)(v)
51
, an organization under 
Section 170(b)(1)(A)(vi)
52
, a 501(c)(3) charitable organization that meets 
the section 509(a)(2) public support test,
53
 or requirements of section 
                                                 
50
 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(1) (2009). 
51
 I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(v) (2015) defines this governmental unit in reference to § 
170(c)(1). That subsection defines such governmental units as “[a] State, a possession of 
the United States, or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or the United 
States or the District of Columbia. . .” § 170(c)(1) (2015).  
52
 § 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) defines this governmental unit in reference to § 170(c)(2) that 
“normally receives a substantial part of its support (exclusive of income received in the 
exercise or performance by such organization of its charitable, educational or other 
purpose or function constituting the basis for its exemption under section 501(a)) from a 
governmental unit referred to in subsection (c)(1) or from direct or indirect contributions 
from the general public.” Id.  
53
 § 509(a)(2) defines such an organization that “(A) normally receives more than one-
 
14





 and “is controlled by an organization described within that 
subsection.”55 Second, to satisfy the “commitment to the conservation 
purposes” requirement, a conservation group organized or operated 
primarily or substantially for one of the conservation purposes specified in 
section 170(h)(4)(A) is required.
56
 Third, the requirement that the donee 
organization have the resources to enforce the easement does not require 
that the organization “set aside funds to enforce the restrictions.”57 These 
                                                                                                                         
third of its support in each taxable year from any combination of: (i) gifts, grants, 
contributions, or membership fees, and (ii) gross receipts from admissions, sales of 
merchandise, performance of services, or furnishing of facilities, in an activity which is 
not an unrelated trade or business (within the meaning of section 513), not including such 
receipts from any person, or from any bureau or similar agency of a governmental unit 
(as described in section 170(c)(1)), in any taxable year to the extent such receipts exceed 
the greater of $5,000 or 1[%] of the organization's support in such taxable year, from 
persons other than disqualified persons (as defined in section 4946) with respect to the 
organization, from governmental units described in section 170(c)(1), or from 
organizations described in section 170(b)(1)(A) (other than in clauses (vii) and (viii)), 
and (B) normally receives not more than one-third of its support in each taxable year 
from the sum of-- (i) gross investment income (as defined in subsection (e)) and (ii) the 
excess (if any) of the amount of the unrelated business taxable income (as defined in 
section 512) over the amount of the tax imposed by section 511.” Id. 
54
 § 509(a)(3) defines such an organization as one that is “(A) is organized, and at all 
times thereafter is operated, exclusively for the benefit of, to perform the functions of, or 
to carry out the purposes of one or more specified organizations described in paragraph 
(1) or (2), (B) is-- (i) operated, supervised, or controlled by one or more organizations 
described in paragraph (1) or (2), (ii) supervised or controlled in connection with one or 
more such organizations, or (iii) operated in connection with one or more such 
organizations, and (C) is not controlled directly or indirectly by one or more disqualified 
persons (as defined in section 4946) other than foundation managers and other than one 
or more organizations described in paragraph (1) or (2).” Id.  
55
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are the only substantial current requirements placed on recipient donee 
organizations. 
B. The Treasury’s Proposal Significantly Increases the 
Amount of Requirements and Liability a “Qualified 
Organization” Takes on as a Conservation Easement 
Deduction Donee 
 
The Treasury proposal suggests that additional regulations should 
be promulgated to increase the requirements placed on “qualified 
organizations” that receive a Conservation Easement Deduction qualifying 
property easement.
58
 The proposal outlines five new requirements. 
First, the new “qualified organization” regulations recommend 
prohibiting a “qualified organization” from being “related to a donor or to 
any person that is or has been related to the donor for at least ten years.”59 
Second, the proposal mentions the regulations be amended to require all 
“qualified organizations” to have “sufficient assets and expertise to be 
reasonably able to enforce the terms of all easements it holds.”60 Third, the 
proposal suggests that it become mandatory that all “qualified 
organizations” have “an approved policy for selecting, reviewing, and 
                                                 
58
 2017 Treasury Proposal, supra note 19, at 213-17. 
59
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approving conservations [sic] easements that fulfill a conservation 
purpose.”61 Fourth, the proposal would subject any organization that 
knows or should have known that it accepted an overvalued easement or 




Last, to increase transparency between the Service and taxpayers, 
the proposal outlines requiring Conservation Easement Deduction donees 
to increase the amount of information they report about the property’s fair 
market values.
63
 The Treasury would do this by amending Section 6033 
“to require electronic reporting and public disclosure by donee 
organizations regarding deductible contributions of easements that is 
sufficient for transparency and accountability.”64 The Treasury proposal 
suggests five specific pieces of information that must be electronically and 
publicly reported by donee organizations.
65
 








 Id. at 215-16. 
65
 Id. at 216. The information the proposal suggests donee organizations release 
electronically and publicly include: (1) detailed descriptions of the subject property and 
restrictions imposed on the property, (2) the conservation purposes served by the 
easement, (3) any rights retained by the donor or related persons, (4) the fair market value 
of both the easement and the full fee interest in the property at the time of the 
 
17
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C. Analysis of Proposal 
The analysis of the five new requirements are considered 
individually and then in the aggregate. The proposal’s suggestion banning 
Conservation Easement Deduction from eligibility organizations that have 
a family relation to a conservation easement donor stems from a concern 
that landowners are granting conservation easements that are merely 
fictitious because the landowner is free to use the land without significant 
impediment by an easement holder. The Treasury had not included this 
recommendation in its annual revenue proposals until the 2016 Fiscal 
Year.
66
 Despite its rationale, this new suggestion is unprecedented within 
the charitable contributions of Section 170 because no such restriction has 
been codified or regulation promulgated. As a result, it is unlikely the 
Treasury will ever promulgate such a regulation.  
Next, the Treasury’s suggestion that “qualified organizations” have 
sufficient assets and expertise to attempt to curb Conservation Easement 
Deduction abuse is merely a rewording of the current regulation’s “have 
                                                                                                                         
contribution; and (5) a description of any easement modifications or actions taken to 
enforce the easement that were taken during the taxable year. Id. 
66
 2016 Treasury Proposal, supra note 31. 
18
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the resources to enforce the restrictions” requirement.67 The new language 
then should not be re-promulgated because it is surplusage.
68
 However, the 
proposal sets out new requirements for a donee organization by requiring 
“qualified organizations” to have “expertise to be reasonably able to 
enforce the terms of all easements it holds.”69 The current requirement, 
that a “qualified organization” merely “demonstrate commitment to 
protect the donated land’s expressed conservation purposes” is a less 
difficult standard for “qualified organizations” to meet for two reasons.  
First, “demonstrating commitment” on its face requires a lower 
standard of behavior on the donee organization’s behalf in relation to a 
conservation compared to “expertise to be reasonably able to enforce the 
terms” because the current regulation’s “demonstrating commitment” 
standard merely requires that the “qualified organization” be a 
conservation group organized or operated primarily or substantially for 
                                                 
67
 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(1) (2009). 
68
 While it may appear that a shift in register from “resources” to “assets” that a 
“qualified organization” indicates the Treasury is more precisely requiring that a 
“qualified organization” have finances available to enforce the terms of a conservation 
easement it controls, current regulations already indicate that the Treasury interprets the 
current “resources” requirement to mean financial resources. See id. (stating that current 
regulations do not require that the organization “set aside funds to enforce the 
restrictions.”). 
69
 2017 Treasury Proposal, supra note 19, at 224. 
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one of the conservation purposes specified in Section 170(h)(4)(A).
70
 
These purposes are the same ones required by a donor of a conservation 
easement. In contrast, it is unclear to what standard an organization 
claiming a primary or substantial conservation purpose will need to rise to 
become an “expert” under the Treasury’s proposal. This could render 
ineligible current “qualified organizations” from being able to receive 
Conservation Easment Deduction contributions in the future. 
Second, the new proposals consider a “qualified organization” and 
its capability to enforce, in the aggregate, all of the conservation 
easements it accepts. Unless carefully drafted, the proposal’s new 
requirement suggesting that “qualified organizations” be conservation 
experts able to enforce the terms of an easement will lead to greater 
uncertainty for donors and donees because both groups will be unsure 
                                                 
70
 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(1) (2009); see also I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(A) (2015):  
“(A) In general.--For purposes of this subsection, the term 
‘conservation purpose’ means-- (i) the preservation of land areas for 
outdoor recreation by, or the education of, the general public, (ii) the 
protection of a relatively natural habitat of fish, wildlife, or plants, or 
similar ecosystem, (iii) the preservation of open space (including 
farmland and forest land) where such preservation is-- (I) for the scenic 
enjoyment of the general public, or (II) pursuant to a clearly delineated 
Federal, State, or local governmental conservation policy, and will 
yield a significant public benefit, or (iv) the preservation of an 
historically important land area or a certified historic structure.”  
Id. 
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whether the donee will sufficiently qualify as an expert according to the 
Treasury. 
The third suggestion from the proposal makes mandatory that all 
“qualified organizations” use a pre-approved plan for evaluating its 
decision to accept conservation easements. Scholars have opined that these 
organizations, which over the past thirty years have consisted primarily of 
land trust associations, should set standardized accreditation 
requirements
71
  to ensure the accuracy of the valuation of conservation 
easements and that the conservation easements are granted for worthwhile 
conservation efforts. The goals suggested by tax scholars are consistent 
with the Treasury’s goals of improving tax administration by removing 
oversight of conservation value from the Service.
72
 The obvious benefits 
of the proposal’s new requirements are that, if properly drafted, these 
regulations should encourage “qualified organizations” to ensure that they 
select conservation easements that are properly valued and are for valid 
conservation purposes under Section 170(h) and its regulations. 
Regulations exhaustively outlining how a “qualified organization” should 
                                                 
71
 McLaughlin, supra note 37, at 9. 
72
 2017 Treasury Proposal, supra note 19.  
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choose conservation easements also should promote transparency in the 
determination process of the value and conservation purpose for a 
conservation easement which currently is, from the Treasury’s 
perspective, a relatively opaque process.
73
 
The fourth suggestion the proposal lays out is a penalty for any 
organization that knows or should have known that a conservation 
easement that it accepted was improperly valued or does not serve a 
qualifying conservation purpose. This penalty is unprecedented not only 
within Section 170’s charitable deductions, but in the entire Tax Code. 




The fifth suggestion the proposal makes in reference to “qualified 
organizations” is that they be required to make certain public and 
electronic disclosures about every conservation easement they accept. 
                                                 
73
 Currently, the Treasury has no way of knowing whether or not a conservation easement 
has been properly valued for Section 170(h) purposes until a taxpayer is audited by the 
Service. A taxpayer making a conservation easement selects an appraiser who has 
discretion to value the conservation according to the valuation methods outlined by 
Section 170(h) and its regulations. Id. at 224. 
74
 See I.R.C. § 6694(a)(1)(B) (2015) (stating that “If a tax return preparer— (B) knew (or 
reasonably should have known) of the position, such tax return preparer shall pay a 
penalty with respect to each such return or claim in an amount equal to the greater of 
$1,000 or 50[%] of the income derived (or to be derived) by the tax return preparer with 
respect to the return or claim.). 
22
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There is no current public reporting requirement for donee organizations 
upon receipt of a conservation easement under Section 170(h) which will 
likely add to the transaction costs associated with Section 170(h) 
conservation easement contributions. 
Combined, the five additional requirements that the proposal 
places on “qualified organizations” are intended to ensure the accuracy of 
donor valuations of conservation easements and that such easements are 
only granted to land that furthers important governmental conservation 
goals that produce significant public benefit. The Treasury views these 
“qualified organizations” as almost quasi-governmental regulatory 
authorities who can validate the accuracy of a donor’s intent in 
contributing a conservation easement. Placing this new set of 
responsibilities on “qualified organizations” should increase transparency 
between taxpayers and the Treasury. 
However, the five new proposals substantially increase the 
regulatory requirements placed on “qualified organizations” and subject 
them to penalties in an unprecedented fashion. Currently, “qualified 
organizations” who receive conservation easements generally pay nothing 
for them; most donees, usually land trusts associations that receive 
23
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conservation easements require that donor’s pay all transaction costs 
related to the conservation easement contribution.
75
 This amount can be 
substantial under the current regulatory scheme, amounting at times up to 
$10,000 or more a donor must pay to donate an easement of his or her 
land.
76
 Therefore, in the aggregate, the increased regulatory burden placed 
on organizations who may receive these easements likely will increase the 
transaction costs associated with accepting responsibility for a Section 
170(h) conservation easement and decrease the number of organizations 
who hold themselves out as “qualified organizations.” 
Increasing the transaction costs of a Section 170(h) contribution 
will likely deter landowners from donating conservation easements. 
Surveys of Conservation Easement Deduction donor intent indicate that 
increased transaction costs dissuade landowners from making such 
                                                 
75
 McLaughlin, supra note 37, at 26, n. 93; see also William T. Hutton, The Munificent 
Conservation Easement, 9 CALIFORNIA LICENSED FORRESTERS ASS’N. (2002), 
http://www.clfa.org/documents/Archives/The-Munificent-Conservation-Easement.pdf 
(noting that the donation of an easement is nearly always conditioned upon a 
simultaneous cash gift sufficient to cover the generally predictable costs of the land trust's 
monitoring responsibilities and the contingent and unpredictable costs of future 
enforcement proceedings). 
76
 McLaughlin, supra note 37, at 26; see also Lynn Asinof, Your Money Matters: 
Conservation Easements Lighten Taxes, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL C15 (Aug. 9, 1999) 
(noting that the easement donation process “typically takes many months, can cost $5,000 
to $10,000 or more, and may require creation of an endowment for the parcel”). 
24





 Additionally, decreasing the number of potential donees 
likely means that those organizations that remain “qualified organizations” 
must either ensure they have to increase their financial resources to 
enforce the increased number of easements they accept, or they will have 
to reject conservation easement contributions. If the number of “qualified 
organizations” decreases, and those that do qualify take on their maximum 
number of easements possible in accordance with their amount of required 
substantial assets, landowners will not be able to find “qualified 
organizations” to which they can donate their land. As a result, 
landowners will not be able to take a Conservation Easement Deduction 
for their land and will likely not place an easement on their land, leaving 
land open to future development. If “qualified organizations” become 
saturated, landowners would effectively become unable to take the 
deduction, which would frustrate Section 170(h)’s broad policy goal of 
preserving the amount of undeveloped land in the United States.
78
  
                                                 
77
 McLaughlin, supra note 37, at 43-47 (analyzing three key national surveys of 
conservation easement donor intent that concludes that reasons for such donations 
included “strong personal attachment to and concern about the long-term stewardship of 
their land” and “for tax incentives”). 
78
 S. REP. NO. 96-1007, at 9-10 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6736, 6744-45 
“The committee believes that the preservation of our country's natural resources and 
cultural heritage is important, and the committee recognizes that conservation easements 
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Empirical studies strongly indicate that in the recent history of Section 
170(h), a significant amount of undeveloped land has been donated that 
would not have been otherwise.
79
 
Indeed, adding additional requirements to “qualified 
organizations” will likely decrease the number of conservation easements 
made because it runs counter to the well-established correlation between 
federal tax incentives and their positive effect on the number of 
conservation easements contributed.
80
 Congress and the Treasury have 
desired to use federal tax incentives to produce more conservation 
easements since the 1980s.
81
 
Other sources have also indicated the importance of the 
Conservation Easement Deduction’s incentives to encourage landowners 
to place conservation easements on their lands. Notably, in a 2013 letter 
                                                                                                                         
now play an important role in preservation efforts. The committee also recognizes that it 
is not in the country's best interest to restrict or prohibit the development of all land areas 
and existing structures. Therefore, the committee believes that provisions allowing 
deductions for conservation easements should be directed at the preservation of unique or 
otherwise significant land areas or structures. Accordingly, the committee has agreed to 
extend the expiring provisions of present law on a permanent basis and modify those 
provisions in several respects.” Id. at 9. 
79
 Id. See also David Marone, Conservation Easements: Protection in Perpetuity (Oct. 3, 
2016, 4:39 PM), THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, http://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-
trumps-tax-numbers-tighten-focus-on-treatment-of-losses-1475415294. 
80
 McLaughlin, supra note 37, at 21. 
81
 Id. at 50. 
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from the Western Governors’ Association to the Senate Finance 
Committee, in response to the pending “Rural Heritage Conservation 
Extension Act of 2013” and its House of Representatives’ counterpart the 
“America Gives More Act,” the Western Governors’ Association affirmed 
its belief that “providing economic incentives for landowners to 
voluntarily participate in conservation efforts is likely to achieve more 
efficient and cost-effective [conservation] results.”82 Multiple surveys 
done nationwide have also indicated that donors contribute Conservation 
Easement Deductions not purely for conservation purposes but 
predominantly for significant federal income tax savings.
83
 
To avoid discouraging landowners from making conservation 
easement contributions and limiting the number of “qualified 
organizations,” the Treasury could ban the applicability of Section 170(h) 
for golf courses for the reasons set forth in Section V of this article. If the 
Treasury still maintained that limitations were necessary for all Section 
170(h) contributions, it should temper their current proposals in two ways.  
                                                 
82
 Letter from Brian Sandoval, Governor, State of Nev., and John Kitzhaber, Governor, 




 McLaughlin, supra note 37, at 43-47. 
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First, the Treasury should abandon penalties on “qualified 
organizations” who “should have known” that upon audit by the Service 
reveal that the conservation easement was overvalued or did not 
adequately further a conservation purpose. This standard exists nowhere 
else in the Tax Code. Taxpayers and “qualified organizations” will be 
unsure for a significant period of time what conduct establishes that a 
“qualified organization” should have known that a conservation easement 
was overvalued or for improper conservation purposes until private letter 
rulings, revenue procedures, revenue rulings, regulations, and tax court 
cases are filed to test this new requirement. Additionally, such a penalty 
should be abandoned because “qualified organizations” do not receive any 
direct monetary benefit by receiving a conservation easement; imposing a 
financial penalty on a “qualified organization” targets the wrong group. 
Any penalty should be imposed on conservation easement donors. 
However, it does seem reasonable that knowingly accepting an improperly 
valued conservation easement should be penalized because this standard is 
a common creature of the Code and easier for the Service to establish in an 
audit contesting the validity of a conservation easement.  But overall, the 
28
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Treasury should not adopt a  
“should have known” penalty on “qualified organizations.”   
Second, the Treasury should temper its current proposals by not 
requiring that “qualified organizations” have the expertise to enforce all 
conservation easement restrictions without explaining in detail through 
regulations how that raises the current standard of behavior and action for 
“qualified organizations.” Otherwise, current “qualified organizations” 
will likely lose eligibility and no longer be able to accept conservation 
easements. Overall, the Treasury should be weary of the effects the five 
new requirements the proposal suggest will have on “qualified 
organizations,” their potential frustrating effect on the Conservation 
Easement Deduction’s legislative purpose, and on the amount of 
conservation easements donated. 
V. THE PROPOSAL INCREASES SUBSTANTIATION REQUIREMENTS ON 
DONORS WITHOUT SETTING CLEAR GUIDELINES  
 
A. Current Regulatory Scheme 
“Conservation purpose” means one of four things under current 
regulations: 
29
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(i) The preservation of land areas for outdoor recreation 
by, or the education of, the general public, within the 
meaning of paragraph (d)(2) of this section, 
(ii) The protection of a relatively natural habitat of fish, 
wildlife, or plants, or similar ecosystem, within the 
meaning of paragraph (d)(3) of this section, 
(iii) The preservation of certain open space (including 
farmland and forest land) within the meaning of 
paragraph (d)(4) of this section, or 
(iv) The preservation of a historically important land area or 
a certified historic structure, within the meaning of 
paragraph (d)(5) of this section.
84
 
Currently, the preservation of open space in Section 1.170A-
14(d)(4)(1) requires that it must be done to achieve a “clearly delineated 
federal, state, or local governmental conservation policy” and create 
significant public benefit,
85
 or be for public “scenic enjoyment” that 
creates substantial public benefit.
86
 The proposal, then, would expand the 
current requirement for conservation easements of all types, not just those 
that preserve open spaces. This section of the regulation also outlines in 
great detail how a donor must demonstrate that the contributed land serves 
a “clearly delineated [governmental] conservation policy”87 and 
                                                 
84
 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(1) (2009).  
85
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determining whether the conservation easement produces a satisfactory 
public benefit.
88
 To establish that a conservation policy is met by a 
conservation easement, the regulations provide that conservation 
easements must “further a specific, identified conservation project” and 
lists several examples of what types of purposes are plainly satisfactory.
89
  
To yield significant public benefit, the conservation easement must 
satisfy a facts and circumstances inquiry that determines whether the 
property satisfies certain unweighted factors.
90
 The regulations currently 
provide 11 such factors that the Service will take into account upon 
auditing a taxpayer claiming a Conservation Easement Deduction.
91
 The 
                                                 
88
 Id.  
89
 Id. “This requirement will be met by donations that further a specific, identified 
conservation project, such as the preservation of land within a state or local landmark 
district that is locally recognized as being significant to that district; the preservation of a 
wild or scenic river, the preservation of farmland pursuant to a state program for flood 
prevention and control; or the protection of the scenic, ecological, or historic character of 
land that is contiguous to, or an integral part of, the surroundings of existing recreation or 
conservation sites. For example, the donation of a perpetual conservation restriction to a 
qualified organization pursuant to a formal resolution or certification by a local 
governmental agency established under state law specifically identifying the subject 
property as worthy of protection for conservation purposes will meet the requirement of 




 Id.  
“(1) The uniqueness of the property to the area;  
(2) The intensity of land development in the vicinity of the property 
(both existing development and foreseeable trends of development);  
(3) The consistency of the proposed open space use with public 
programs (whether Federal, state or local) for conservation in the 
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proposal does not indicate that the Treasury will promulgate additional 
regulations to more concretely determine whether a conservation easement 
creates the necessary amount of public benefit to qualify for the 
Conservation Easement Deduction. 
It is noteworthy that “clearly delineated conservation purpose” and 
“significant public benefit yield” are statutory requirements that are 
unprecedented.
92
 These dual requirements have no companions in any 
place in the Tax Code. They did not come in existence until the Tax 
                                                                                                                         
region, including programs for outdoor recreation, irrigation or water 
supply protection, water quality maintenance or enhancement, flood 
prevention and control, erosion control, shoreline protection, and 
protection of land areas included in, or related to, a government 
approved master plan or land management area; 
(4) The consistency of the proposed open space use with existing 
private conservation programs in the area, as evidenced by other land, 
protected by easement or fee ownership by organizations referred to in 
§ 1.170A–14(c)(1), in close proximity to the property; 
(5) The likelihood that development of the property would lead to or 
contribute to degradation of the scenic, natural, or historic character of 
the area; 
(6) The opportunity for the general public to use the property or to 
appreciate its scenic values; 
(7) The importance of the property in preserving a local or regional 
landscape or resource that attracts tourism or commerce to the area; 
(8) The likelihood that the donee will acquire equally desirable and 
valuable substitute property or property rights; 
(9) The cost to the donee of enforcing the terms of the conservation 
restriction; 
(10) The population density in the area of the property; and 
(11) The consistency of the proposed open space use with a 
legislatively mandated program identifying particular parcels of land 
for future protection.” Id. 
92
 See Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-605, 94 Stat. 3521 (1980). 
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Treatment Extension Act of 1980 and have only been given elaboration 
based on a Senate Finance Committee report.
93
 
B. The Treasury’s Proposals 
The proposal describes modifying the current definition of 
“conservation purposes” by requiring “all contributed easements further a 
clearly delineated Federal conservation policy (or an authorized State or 
tribal government policy) and yield significant benefit.”94 Additionally, 
the proposal would increase the amount of “conservation purpose” 
substantiation required by a donor, by requiring him or her to give 
exhaustive summaries of the conservation purpose served by the easement 
and the public benefits it will yield.
95
 An organization and its managers 
would incur a penalty if they warrant certain “values that they know (or 
should know) are substantially overstated.”96  This is a departure from the 
current regulatory scheme that only requires such conservation purpose 
substantiation for the preservation of open spaces. As described below in § 
IV(C) of this Article, the Treasury will likely apply the “conservation 
                                                 
93
 McLaughlin, supra note 37, at 14-15. 
94
 2017 Treasury Proposal, supra note 19. 
95
 Id. at 215. Additionally, a donor must substantiate and warrant that the fair market 
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purposes” and “public benefit” regulations for preservation of open spaces 
purposes to all conservation easements irrespective of a conservation 
easement’s conservation purpose. 
C. Analysis of Proposal 
Given that a current subsection of Section 170(h) already contains 
exhaustive regulations outlining what constitutes an appropriate 
governmental conservation purpose and requisite public benefit, it is likely 
that the Treasury will base any new regulations on these current ones for 
their expanded application to all types of land eligible for the 
Conservation Easement Deduction. Application of the current regulations 
will have three significant implications for Conservation Easement 
Deduction donors. 
First, the proposal’s requirement that a conservation easement 
“further a specific, identified conservation project”97 likely will create 
uncertainty for taxpayers unless, like the current regulations, more 
examples are included illustrating what conservation easements 
accomplish such purposes. Second, the current “facts and circumstances” 
inquiry based on 11 un-weighted factors to determine whether a 
                                                 
97
 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(1) (2009). 
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conservation easement’s conservation purpose yields significant benefit 
will similarly create significant taxpayer uncertainty. Unless a more 
formulaic method for determining substantial public benefit is 
promulgated, taxpayer uncertainty seems inevitable for all Conservation 
Easement Deduction donors. Lastly, given the new substantiation 
requirements placed on donors for valuation and conservation purposes, 
this will likely increase transaction costs associated with the conservation 
easement contribution. Given that an increase in transaction costs 
decreases the amount of conservation easements donated, these provisions 
frustrate the Conservation Easement Deduction’s purpose.98 Taxpayers 
will expend more in receiving expert determinations whether their 
conservation easements yield enough public benefit for a qualifying 
                                                 
98
 S. REP. NO. 96-1007, at 9-10 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6736, 6744-
45: 
“The committee believes that the preservation of our country's natural 
resources and cultural heritage is important, and the committee 
recognizes that conservation easements now play an important role in 
preservation efforts. The committee also recognizes that it is not in the 
country's best interest to restrict or prohibit the development of all land 
areas and existing structures. Therefore, the committee believes that 
provisions allowing deductions for conservation easements should be 
directed at the preservation of unique or otherwise significant land 
areas or structures. Accordingly, the committee has agreed to extend 
the expiring provisions of present law on a permanent basis and modify 
those provisions in several respects.”  
Id. 
35
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conservation purpose. Another potential transaction cost may be a 
taxpayer seeking a private letter ruling from the Service to determine 
whether his or her conservation easement is for a valid conservation 
purpose that yield significant public benefit. Receiving such a ruling is 
expensive,
99
 but given the average amount donors receive in the 
deduction, taxpayers likely will want to guarantee their conservation 
easement meets these requirements.
100
 
It seems likely, then, that as transaction costs increase, the number 
of future donors will decrease because the value of the Conservation 
Easement Deduction will be less significant. A decrease in the number of 
Section 170(h) donors, however, may not be wholly disadvantageous from 
a policy standpoint. Increased substantiation should deter landowners from 
making Section 170(h) donations who do so for land that lacks such 
significant conservation merit. From this perspective, increased 
substantiation for all Conservation Easement Deduction donors will deter 
fraudulent or less meritorious uses of the Conservation Easement 
Deduction. However, if the Service and the Treasury are predominantly 
                                                 
99
 Rev. Proc. 2016-1 I.R.B. App’x A. Private letter rulings costs range between $250 and 
$50,000. Id. 
100
 Joint Comm. on Tax’n, supra note 24. 
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concerned with landowners claiming conservation easements for land used 
as a golf course, then an outright ban, as Section V of this Article explains, 
would be a more efficient way to reduce taxpayer fraud without increasing 
transaction costs that deter meritorious conservation easements 
contributions. 
VI. THE PROPOSAL’S EXCLUSION OF GOLF COURSES IS CONSISTENT 
WITH SECTION 170(H)’S LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE 
 
There are currently no regulations that specifically address golf 
courses for Conservation Easement Deduction purposes. In contrast, the 
proposal seeks banning “any contribution of a partial interest in property 
that is, or is intended to be, used as a golf course.”101 The Treasury’s 
proposal is consistent with its position as expressed in the Treasury’s 
revenue proposals for fiscal years 2013, 2014, and 2016.
102
 It is 
                                                 
101
 2017 Treasury Proposal, supra note 19, at 216. 
102
 2014 Treasury Proposal, supra note 31; 2013 Treasury Proposal, supra note 31; 2016 
Treasury Proposal, supra note 31. All three proposals state verbatim “The proposal would 
amend the charitable contribution deduction provision to prohibit a deduction for any 
contribution of property that is, or is intended to be, used as a golf course.” The 
Treasury’s revenue proposal for fiscal year 2015 leaves out a proposal recommending 
that golf courses no longer qualify under Section 170(h), but instead focuses on 
increasing the amount of deductions farmers and ranchers can deduct for issuing a 
conservation easement over their lands. 2015 Treasury Proposal, supra note 31, at 195. 
Therefore, despite the omission of golf courses from the Treasury’s revenue proposals in 
2015, it is reasonable to infer that the Treasury has consistently maintained that golf 
courses should no longer qualify under Section 170(h) since its revenue proposal for 
fiscal year 2013. Id. 
37
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noteworthy that it was in 2013 that the Service lost Kiva Dunes and began 




The Treasury’s proposal to prohibit land used or intended for use 
as a golf course from Section 170(h) qualifications is reasonable because 
golf courses and their coinciding use are not consistent under regulatory 
definition for “recreation purposes.” Indeed, the Treasury explained that 
golf courses, especially those that are located in high-income private 
housing, present a unique class of conservation easements the Service has 
difficulty effectively auditing.
104
 The Treasury explains that significant 
Conservation Easement Deductions taken for preserving “recreational 
amenities, including golf courses, surrounded by upscale private home 
sites . . . may accrue to a limited number of users such as members of the 
course club or the owners of the surrounding homes, not the general 
public.”105 In contrast, Section 170(h)’s regulations list no example of 
Section 170(h) qualifying property that is similar to a golf course. 
Examples of farmland preserved for flood prevention, natural land 
                                                 
103
 Dezember, supra note 13. 
104
 2013 Treasury Proposal, supra note 31; 2017 Treasury Proposal, supra note 19. 
105
 2017 Treasury Proposal, supra note 19, at 224. 
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formations to be enjoyed by the public, and woodlands along public 
highways are clearly what the Treasury intended the Section 170(h) 
deduction be taken for.
106
 Section 170(h)’s examples also describe 
undeveloped lands, especially in highly developed and populated 
metropolitan areas.
107
 All of the examples Section 170(h)’s regulations 
contemplate do not include land used as a golf course. The exclusion of 
golf courses from Section 170(h) seems reasonable given that it has no 
regulatory example that supports their inclusion. 
Additionally, golf course construction and management may 
contradict conservation purposes. The Treasury notes in its proposal that 
golf courses “may even result in environmental degradation.”108 This idea 
does not seem so farfetched with reports of the chemicals used on golf 
courses and the relatively insignificant size of ecological habitats that can 
be reasonably claimed to be preserved by the golf course management.
109
  
A recent case illustrates this. In Atkinson v. Commissioner, the tax 
court held that a golf course’s use of pesticides and other chemical 
                                                 
106




 2017 Treasury Proposal, supra note 19, at 224. 
109
 Rubin, supra note 15.  
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treatments damaged the land’s ecosystem which is inapposite with 
Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(e)(2)
 110
 that states “the preservation of 
… [land] would not [satisfy the conservation purpose test] if under the 
terms of the contribution a significant naturally occurring ecosystem could 
be injured or destroyed by the use of pesticides.”111 As a result, the 
taxpayer was denied $7.88 million deduction.
112
 The Atkinson case 
illustrates how golf courses do not generally conform to the “recreational 




Moreover, by definition, granting a conservation easement 
prohibits the donor from developing the property to protect the easement’s 
conservation purpose. While that conservation purpose may vary, any 
donor action that compromises that conservation purpose should cause the 
donor to forfeit his or her Conservation Easement Deduction because he or 
she resumes enjoying unrestricted use of the property. This is a problem 
                                                 
110
 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(e)(2) (2009). 
111
 See generally Atkinson v. C.I.R., 110 T.C.M. 1 (CCH) 550 (T.C. 2015). 
112
 Id. at 2. 
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that has arisen with golf courses specifically, unlike other conservation 
easements. Reports of donors claiming paved pathways, tees, fairways, 




The three above reasons demonstrate how golf courses vary 
considerably from the types of land and conservation purposes intended by 
Section 170(h) and its regulations. These reasons support the Treasury’s 
suggestion that golf courses should be denied Section 170(h) eligibility. 
The Treasury should promulgate regulations to make such a ban because 
doing so is the most efficient way to deal with the majority of taxpayer 
Section 170(h) abuse. It is the most efficient regulatory approach for three 
reasons.  
 First, a ban would eliminate all future litigation against taxpayers 
claiming Conservation Easement Deductions for golf courses. Golf course 
conservation easement audits and tax court cases have been the most 
contentious and difficult for the Service to determine if a conservation 
easement in question was properly valued and for valid conservation 
                                                 
114
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 Banning golf courses from Conservation Easement Deduction 
eligibility would prevent the Service from having to continue its current 
crackdown on golf courses in litigation as it has done for the past ten 
years.
116
 Therefore, a golf course ban from Conservation Easement 
Deduction eligibility would reduce the amount of time the Service spends 
auditing and litigating golf course lawsuits and allows “qualified 
organizations” and donors to make conservation easement contributions 
with only its current statutory and regulatory obligations. 
Second, a Section 170(h) ban of golf courses allows meritorious 
conservation easement contributions to occur between donors and 
“qualified organizations” under only the current statutory and regulatory 
requirements. Sections III and IV of this Article discussed the increased 
obligations and liabilities that “qualified organizations” and conservation 
easement donors would take on if those regulations were promulgated and 
the decrease in conservation easements made they would likely cause. To 
avoid these adverse effects, the Treasury should merely ban golf courses 
from Section 170(h) eligibility. 




 Id.; McLaughlin, supra note 22. 
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Third, a categorical ban on golf courses from Section 170(h) 
eligibility provides the most efficient regulatory scheme the Treasury 
could pursue to achieve its policy goals of promoting greater taxpayer 




Denying golf courses from Section 170(h) eligibility will mean 
that worthwhile conservation efforts will be frustrated because a 
significant number of golf courses promote valid conservation efforts;
118
 
however, given that golf course use runs primarily counter to the valid 
conservation efforts for which its owner claims a conservation easement, 
if the Treasury is prepared to ban golf courses outright from Section 
170(h) eligibility, the Treasury should not also increase requirements on 
non-golf course Conservation Easement Deduction donors. As Sections III 
and IV of this article demonstrate, promulgating regulations to add 
requirements on “qualified organizations” and conservation easement 
donors will likely discourage donors from making such donations because 
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of high transaction costs
119
 and decrease the number of “qualified 
organizations”120 who can accept Section 170(h) conservation easements. 
Overall, a ban on golf courses is the most efficient way for the Service to 
avoid costly litigation and to promote the donation of conservation 
easements. 
VII. THE SUGGESTED TAX CREDIT PROGRAM OFFERS TAXPAYER 
CHOICE IN TAX INCENTIVES FOR CONSERVATION EASEMENT 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
The Treasury proposed creating a non-refundable tax credit for 
conservation easement contributions.
121
 The Treasury would create a 
federal interagency board that distributed the amount of conservation 
easement contribution tax credits permitted by the Treasury annually to 
“qualified charitable organizations and governmental entities that hold and 
enforce conservation easements.”122 In its first year, the Treasury would 
permit $100 million and would increase that amount to $475 million 
annually and adjusted for inflation, if the pilot program is successful.
123
 
Conservation easement donors could receive up to a 50% of the fair 
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market value of their easement in credits that could be used to offset their 
income tax liability.
124
 Any residual credit could be carried forward 15 
years.
125
 The proposal also requests that a Congressional report be made 
by the Secretaries of the Treasury, Agriculture, and the Interior on the 
merits of the conservation easement credit to compare it to Section 
170(h)’s deduction.126 
On its face, the aggregate amount the Treasury proposes to set 
aside for the Tax Credit seems small compared to the $1.1 billion claimed 
in deductions by 1,112 taxpayers in 2012 claiming Section 170(h) 
deductions. However, this disparity is conflated because the $1.1 billion 
figure reflects the amount of income that goes untaxed and not the total 
amount of tax liability of individual taxpayers forgone. 
Unlike a tax deduction that reduces a taxpayer’s taxable income, a 
tax credit offsets dollar-for-dollar a taxpayer’s income tax liability.127 This 








 Key Elements of U.S. Tax System (2016) TAX POLICY CENTER, 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/whats-difference-between-tax-deductions-
and-tax-credits. “Deductions reduce taxable income and their value thus depends on the 
taxpayer’s marginal tax rate, which rises with income. Credits reduce taxes directly and 
do not depend on tax rates. However, the value of credits may depend on the taxpayer’s 
basic tax liability. Nonrefundable credits can reduce tax to zero but any credit beyond 
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means that, if the tax deduction were structured as a tax credit, the current 
amount claimed would equate to $363 million.
128
 Given that scholars have 
determined that the Service has forgone $112 million because of 
fraudulent or overvalued Section 170(h),
129
 this makes the real amount of 
current deduction translated into tax credit less fraud about $250 million. 
If the pilot tax credit is electable, the Treasury’s pilot tax credit amount of 
$100 million seems patently reasonable. Indeed, the significant increase in 
the amount of credit to be available in the aggregate indicates that the 
Treasury may wish to phase out the Conservation Easement Deduction. 
While beyond the scope of the proposals, a movement towards a tax credit 
for Section 170(h) would benefit “land rich income poor” landowners who 
grant conservation easements because those landowners have less taxable 
income, on average, than landowners with higher incomes.
130
 
Additionally, vesting in decentralized organizations the power to grant tax 
credits may be an effective way of ensuring the Treasury’s Section 170(h) 
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policy goals of transparency and accuracy of conservation easement 
valuation and conservation purpose substantiation. 
For individual taxpayers, this proposed conservation easement tax 
credit is good for donors who do not generate enough taxable income over 
the 15-year carry forward period for the current deduction.
 131
 In contrast, 
a tax credit offsets a taxpayer’s tax liability and can be carried forward to 
offset tax liability for 15 years. Overall, if the Treasury wishes to give 
“land rich income poor” landowners greater tax incentive to make 
conservation easements, then it should pilot the tax credit. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This article examined the United States Treasury Department’s 
current proposals for amending Section 170(h) of the Internal Revenue 
Code in light of ongoing litigation that the Internal Revenue Service is 
pursuing against taxpayers who are claiming substantial amounts of 
deductions for the conservation easements they contribute.
132
 Until now, 
litigation has been the only way that the Internal Revenue Service has 
been able to test the validity of a taxpayer’s Conservation Easement 
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 this Article suggests that the most efficient regulatory 
approach the Treasury could take to curb taxpayer abuse of Section 170(h) 
is to categorically ban golf courses from deduction eligibility. Doing so, as 
opposed to adding additional obligations and potential penalties to 
“qualified organizations”134 – most of which pay nothing to receive the 
conservation easement – and to donors that are foregoing land they could 
profitably develop, would prevent “qualified organizations” from losing 
their qualified status, and prevent donors from being discouraged to make 
conservation easement contributions. By banning golf courses from 
Section 170(h) eligibility, the Service will likely not have to audit and 
litigate against taxpayers because the majority of future fraudulent Section 
170(h) claims will be prevented from making any deduction at all. 
An outright ban of golf courses also avoids the need for the Service 
to modify the “conservation purpose” requirement under Section 170(h)135 
that would increase transaction costs on potential conservation easement 
donors. To further Section 170(h)’s legislative purpose to decrease the 
development of land in the United States, the Treasury could consider 
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implementing a tax credit in lieu of the Conservation Easement Deduction 
to encourage conservation easement donations by “land rich, income 
poor” landowners.136 In any scenario, a Section 170(h) ban on golf courses 
creates the most efficient regulatory scheme for preventing taxpayer abuse 
and avoiding costly litigation. 
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